The empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia shows the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We show that LP in Russia makes enforcement of the behavior of market participants less effective and accordingly reduces cartel discoveries. However the reforms of Program in 2009 give some positive results.
Introduction
During the last twenty years leniency program (LP) has become the subject theoretical research which shows how the models developed in the literature can be used to estimate their effect. A separate line of academic research is the empirical assessment of results of the application of LP. Such research has been conducted by foreign economist-researchers using specially created databases. There are still many questions connected with LP, not only in Russia, but also in the international research. In particular, how the market characteristics and national antitrust legislation influence in effects of LP.
The literature on LP in antimonopoly policy discusses the advantages and disadvantages of repentance. LP has been introduced in many countries over the last thirty-five years, with differing results. LP has a long history in the US, the first Corporate Leniency Program was In Europe the first LP was introduced in 1996. A modified LP introduced by the EC in 2002 gave complete immunity from fines to firms which were the first to submit evidence of a cartel to the antitrust authorities. Similar programs were introduced in 2002 in the UK and other European countries. An analysis of the effects of these LP showed that there are fewer cartel agreements (see, for example, Motchenkova [2004] ).
Research into LP effects is needed in countries, such as Russia, without settled traditions of law enforcement, with a young Antitrust Authority, and where courts and national companies are unused to antitrust requirements. LP was first introduced in Russia in 2007, but after two years it was reformed as the initial version did not fulfill the criteria of an effective program and did not provide the necessary incentives for market participants (see, for example, ). According to the 2007 Federal law № 45-FL "About modification of the Administrative Offences Code of the Russian Federation" there are conditions which will be granted an immunity for cartel violations.
In a note to article 14.32 of the "Administrative Offences Code of the Russian The purpose of this research is the empirical assessment of LP as an instrument to prevent cartel agreements in Russia. The results will help to interpret with caution the impact of LP on cartel agreements.
LENIENCY PROGRAM EFFECTS: LITERATURE SURVEY

 THE THEORY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF LP ON THE RESTRAINT AND PREVENTION
OF COLLUSION
The academic development about the enforcement of LP is the perspective direction of empirical researches around the world. The empirical assessment of LP effects within the framework of institutional researches in Russia allows to show the influence of rules change on the behavior of market participants.
Two directions for the assessment of LP effects are provided by Motta and Polo (see, for example, Motta & Polo [2003] ) and Aubert and coauthors (see, for example, Aubert et al., [2006] ).
In the work of Motta and Polo the optimal policy of an antimonopoly authority is analyzed in the conditions of alternative rules in relation to various types of agreements. It describes the positive impact on antimonopoly policy by the use of reduced penalties. The main effect of LP under this approach is to reduce the expenditure of antimonopoly authorities.
Aubert and his colleagues show a mechanism of incentives for companies to refuse to participate in cartels. A similar approach shows, for example, how in the case of the initial value of the discount factor, LP implemented by the antimonopoly authorities limits the value of participating in cartels (see also Fraas & Greer [1977] ).
These two theories correspond to the empirical works devoted to the assessment of the effects of LP both for markets, and for activities of antimonopoly authorities. The research described in this article follows the work of Aubert and his colleagues and studies the impact of LP on markets, not on antimonopoly authorities.
 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON LENIENCY PROGRAM EFFECTS
A separate direction of academic research is the empirical assessment of the results of the implementation of LP. Examples of research on the basis of specially created databases are the works of Miller (2009 ), Marvao (2010 , and Klein (2010) for the European Union.
A distinction in the approaches of the assessment of LP can be illustrated by a comparison of the methods of Miller (2009) and Klein (2010) . By using U.S. Department of Justice data from 1985 to 2005 Miller tests the dependence of cartel discoveries on the introduction of LP, on cycle phase (measured by the change in gross domestic product), on the antimonopoly authority budget and on the amount of penalties imposed for the previous fiscal year. In the Poisson regression a variable is included which describes the time from the introduction of the LP. In various specifications it was shown that LP have a significant influence on the increase of the number of cartel discoveries.
Klein used the indicator "share of profit in the price" as an indicator of competition intensity as a dependent variable, broken down by EU types of activities, and as independent variables indicators of separate tools of economic policy (including LP) and structural characteristics of activity were used. The profitability reduction in highly concentrated markets is interpreted as meaning it is possible to give up on cartel agreements because of LP. However a drawback of this analysis is the complexity of interpreting the "share of profit in the price". This problem has been widely studied in modern empirical market research, and a high "share of profit in the price" shows the role of non-price competition in the market, and low costs (for example, from accounting policies). The correlation this indicator with competition and its restrictions is not obvious. 2) increasing, reducing or maintaining prices in course of competitive bidding;
3) dividing the goods market according to a geographic principle, the quantity of sales or the purchase of goods, the mix of goods or a composition of buyers or sellers; 4) reducing or terminating the production of goods; or 5) refusing to conclude contracts with particular sellers or buyers.
In this paper only classic horizontal agreements are studied. So for the assessment of LP effects in Russia and for the opportunity to compare them, with similar programs in other countries only those explicit collusions which are illegal according to the Russian antitrust legislation and would be illegal in foreign markets were chosen. It is necessary to distinguish classic cartel agreements from concerted practice and other types of agreements which can restrict competition. The European Commission concentrates on horizontal agreements with price-fixing, market sharing, bid-rigging and tender fixing, export cartels, marketing and advertising agreements, agreements on standards, and exchange of information. These are the types of agreements that would be considered as horizontal "concerted practices" in the EU, and so, can be subject to leniency guidelines.
The antimonopoly authority of Russia identified 300-500 horizontal agreements for the period 2004-2011 under the article 11 of Federal Law "On the Protection of Competition", and very few classic cartels were found.
DATA AND SAMPLE INFORMATION
The database is created using market characteristics. This corresponds with tradition of Abert et al. (2006) who studied directly or indirectly the impact of LP on markets, but not on antimonopoly authorities. The structure of the database includes 4 criteria which are used to select cartel agreements. These are "the characteristics of the cartel agreement", "antitrust policies", "facilitating and self-enforcing techniques", and "market characteristics".
"The characteristics of the cartel agreement" includes the type of agreement, the number of participants, the market, the nature of the infringement (price fixing, market sharing, bid rigging), start and end time of the cartel. The end of the cartel agreement can depend on the FAS, the courts, or the participants themselves.
"Antitrust policies" is necessary for LP effect assessment and sanctions. In the analysis of cartel agreements the end of collusion according with to the introduced changes in the LP enforcement is considered, namely whether the cartel ended before April 2007, after July 2009, or between these dates. At the same time cartel agreements can be detected independently by FAS and therefore regardless of LP. Sanctions are the primary instrument in the prevention of antitrust violations. The fact is that in Russia the decision about the imposing of fine is made separately from the decision about conviction of company. At first the company must be found convict, and then FAS separately makes the decision about penalty. However if the company brings such decision about guilt into challenge, so the decision procedurally about penalty is blocked. Until the company is challenging the FAS decision, it isn't worth to make the decision about administrative penalty. Therefore the decision about penalty can be different in time (months, even years) from the main decision. Besides, FAS can make a decision not to impose penalties. Other moment which also should take into account in the analysis of cartel, is the old cases (relating to the period before 2007). The fact is the turnover-based fines were not excised in the period before 2007). So our database consists of cartel agreements which were not imposed by penalties according to the FAS decision, and also the cartel agreements which did not have the FAS decisions yet.
"Facilitating and self-enforcing techniques" is devoted to the sustainability of a cartel.
Members often devise multipronged mechanisms to monitor one another to detect and punish cheating. Self-enforcing techniques include threats, information exchange, compensation schemes between cartel members, and price-leader or quantity-leader.
"Market characteristics" includes the market type (national, regional, local), market concentration, and the type of goods (final product, intermediate product or service).
Cartel agreements took place in a range of markets for example, chemical products (caustic soda, cable plastics, liquid chlorine, industrial explosives), primary commodity markets (coal, gas), alcohol, food salt, financial services, and transport services. The markets of food salt, caustic soda, aluminum alloys are considered highly concentrated; the match market has middle concentration; the markets of financial services and industrial explosives have a low concentration.
Highly concentrated markets create restrictions for new participants. All things being equal, the higher the concentration, the more collusion is expected because of increased benefits.
High concentration facilitates the coordination of market behavior and makes the enforcement of the collusion easier and more effective. It is also easier for participants to track and punish those who deviate from the cartel agreement. Most infringements described in Appendix 1 were in the form of price fixing and market sharing. All the bid-rigging discoveries took place after 2008. It is connected with the fact that efforts to develop competition in these markets were undertaken (Yakovlev & Demidova [2012] ).
Thus, there are doubts as to whether LP has an essential impact on cartel discoveries, and on the behavior of market participants.
KEY HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
The main result confirmed the effect of LP is a decrease in the stability of cartels, illustrated by the break up of already existing cartels and the absence of incentives for new cartel agreements. The usage of additional indicators of the LP enforcement (the characteristics of agreements, the structure of markets where agreements are concluded, the enforcement mechanisms inside a cartel) also could confirmed the efficiency of LP (see also, for example, Fraas & Greer [1977] ).
Firms agreeing not to compete with one another is the most serious violation of competition law. They injure customers by raising prices and restricting supply, thus making goods and services unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily expensive for others. The categories of conduct considered most serious are: price fixing, output restrictions, market sharing, collusive tenders.
LP enforcement leads to a decrease in the number of cartels where cartels are less likely to occur. This was confirmed by Fraas and Greer (1977) who showed, first, the structural conditions most favorable to tacit cooperation are a relatively small number of rival firms and a market setting relatively free of complications. Second, a variety of regimental or disciplinary arrangements (for example, trade associations, single sales agencies) can facilitate tacit or explicit cooperation under more adverse structural conditions. Also they were the first to match these conditions with cartel stability.
This paper studies the effects of LP on cartel agreements, evidence of program effectiveness is:
(1) A decrease in number of participants of cartel discoveries;
(2) A decrease in number of cartels in the markets with low concentration;
(3) A decrease in cartel duration;
In the econometric analysis I use two variables as explained variables. One variable describes cartel duration dur in the market i for the period t expressed in months proven by documented evidence. The other variable describes a number of the participants firms. This variable is important because the number of cartel participants influences the incentives to support collusion.
The independent variables described in table 2, are divided into 4: agreement type, antimonopoly policy, market and industry characteristics, and actions of participants inside of cartel. All hypotheses for testing are described in this table also. 
Tab.2. Characteristic of independent variables Variables
Н4: That the various mechanisms of cartel stability effectively discipline its participants.
Taking into account the tested hypotheses the specification of regression model looks as follows:
The regression model Poisson's distribution is used to test the required dependence. In the Poisson model the probability of implementation it y of separate outcome it dur is modeled as follows:
Var dur x   (equidispersion) is a significant restriction of these models type, (see, for example, Verbeek Also because of small number of observations the regressors were included by "clusters" depending on the tested hypothesis. In the analysis I use recurring regression, but not panel regression. All additional explaining variables are used to test the stability of the main results. Table 3 presents the Poisson regression results of the effects of LP on detection capability.
REGRESSION RESULTS
In the regression, the dependent variable is the number of infringers Firms. Column 1 includes did not reduce the number of infringers. This absence of evidence about program's effect means that the program did not make a positive impact on prevention. Not only have more stable cartels remained (with fewer participants), but also less stable cartels. A significant number of applications (500 in a year) for full or partial immunity from fines in exchange for disclosure of information regarding cartel operation does not mean that incentives to create cartels decrease.
And the reform of the LP in 2009 led to cartels being operated by only a small number of participants. This suggests that less stable collusions either were not created, or collapsed, and only the more stable ones survived. But this could be viewed as evidence that the LP reforms reduced the incentives to be involved in illegal activities.
The average number of cartel discoveries increased until 2008 and then decreased. (Figure   1 ). Although fines are the primary instrument in the prevention of antitrust violations, the results show this to be the smallest coefficient among independent variables. In other words fines create a credible threat of being prosecuted and sanctioned. With the increase in fines the number of participants in a cartel decreases. This is because the opportunity to be the first to receive full or partial immunity from fines reduces the incentives to support the cartel agreement. The results in table 3 suggest that an increase in the expected profit with fewer cartel members compensates for the decrease in the expected profit if fined. The coefficients (lpsr2) and (ms) are insignificant.
The hypothesis is that industries with low concentration will show a decrease in cartels. = 0.6479 The coefficients (lpsr2) are not significant. Table 7 shows that the hypothesis about the impact on cartel discipline of various internal mechanisms is confirmed. The coefficients of all variables are positive and statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level except coefficients of lpsr2, ret, sidarr. The results of the regression suggest that various disciplinary mechanisms can promote the stability of cartels.
Interestingly, the results provide little support for the empirical findings of Fraas and Greer (1977) . that a set of such mechanisms can promote obvious and silent collusions in more adverse markets. 
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